Distributed Linear Precoder Optimization and Base Station Selection for
  an Uplink Heterogeneous Network by Hong, Mingyi & Luo, Zhi-Quan
ar
X
iv
:1
20
5.
01
81
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
19
 Se
p 2
01
2
1
Distributed Linear Precoder Optimization and Base
Station Selection for an Uplink Heterogeneous
Network
Mingyi Hong and Zhi-Quan Luo
Abstract
In a heterogeneous wireless cellular network, each user may be covered by multiple access points such as
macro/pico/relay/femto base stations (BS). An effective approach to maximize the sum utility (e.g., system through-
put) in such a network is to jointly optimize users’ linear procoders as well as their base station associations. In this
paper we first show that this joint optimization problem is NP-hard and thus is difficult to solve to global optimality.
To find a locally optimal solution, we formulate the problem as a noncooperative game in which the users and
the BSs both act as players. We introduce a set of new utility functions for the players and show that every Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the resulting game is a stationary solution of the original sum utility maximization problem.
Moreover, we develop a best-response type algorithm that allows the players to distributedly reach a NE of the
game. Simulation results show that the proposed distributed algorithm can effectively relieve local BS congestion
and simultaneously achieve high throughput and load balancing in a heterogeneous network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a multicell heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which every cell is installed with not only a macro base
station (BS) but also a set of micro/pico/femto base stations, all equipped with multiple antennas and sharing the
same frequency band. In such a network, the users are often simultaneously covered by multiple BSs with different
capabilities and load status. If the users in a HetNet are assigned to BSs simply according to their received signal
strengths (as is done in conventional cellular networks), then a BS located close to a hot spot may experience severe
congestion, causing poor quality of service in the network. Indeed, it has been shown that the signal strength based
approach for user-BS association in a HetNet can be highly suboptimal for congestion management and fairness
provisioning [2], [3]. For a HetNet, the overall system performance depends not only on the physical layer choices
of precoder design and power control, but also on how the users and the BSs are associated. Consequently, BS
assignment should be an integral part of physical layer optimization of the overall system performance.
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2Conventionally, physical layer resource management and network performance optimization involve such aspects
as transceiver design, power control and spectrum management, while the user-BS assignment is assumed known
and fixed. For example, under this assumption, game theoretic approaches have been used to design optimal transmit
precoders for a MIMO interference channel (MIMO-IC). The authors of [4], [5], among others, propose to formulate
the transmit covariance matrix optimization problem as a noncooperative game in which the transmitters/users
compete with each other for transmission. Reference [6] further takes into consideration the robustness issue of the
problem. In these studies, each user selfishly maximizes its own transmission rate, while treating all other users’
interference as noise. Simple distributed algorithms (based on iterative water-filling) are derived with convergence
guarantees, but the resulting solutions of the game are inefficient in terms of system throughput. This is due to both
the lack of coordination among the transmitters/users and the choice of utility functions which do not consider the
interference effect on other users in the system.
In addition to the competitive design, we can also design transmit precoders by maximizing a suitable system
utility function. Unfortunately, most optimization problems in this category have been proven to be NP-hard in
various settings [7]–[10]. As a result, many authors focus on developing efficient algorithms to compute high
quality sub-optimal solutions for these problems, e.g., in MIMO-IC, [11], [12], MISO-IC [13]–[15] and MIMO-IC
with a single data stream per user [16], [17]. In particular, references [11], [12] propose an iterative algorithm based
on the first order Taylor approximation of the nonconcave part of the weighted sum rate (WSR) objective. It is
shown that the WSR values generated by this algorithm increase monotonically, but the convergence of the users’
transmit covariances (to a stationary solution) is left unproven. For the problem of maximizing a general utility
function, reference [8] proposes a cyclic ascent method for linear precoder design in a MISO network. The proposed
algorithm can deal with any smooth utility functions and is known to converge to a stationary solution. Reference
[9] develops an algorithm that optimizes the Max-Min utility in a MIMO network by adapting the transmit and
receive precoders alternately. References [18], [19] propose a weighted Minimum Mean Square Error (WMMSE)
algorithm in which the transmitters and receivers iteratively update their linear transmit and receive strategies to
optimize the system utility function. The authors show that as long as the system utility function satisfies some
mild regularity conditions, their algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a stationary point of the problem.
All of the above cited works aim at optimizing the linear transceiver structures under the assumption that the
transmitter-receiver association is known and fixed. The problem of joint cell site selection and power allocation
in the traditional CDMA based network has been first considered in [20]–[22] and later in a game theoretical
perspective in [23], [24]. The objective of the network optimization is to minimize the users’ total transmit power
subject to a set of individual SNR constraints. In these works, the users optimize their uplink power levels and/or
transmit beams as well as their BS associations. The phenomenon of “cell breathing” is observed whereby the sizes
of the cells dynamically change according to the congestion levels. Recently references [25]–[27] have considered
the joint BS selection and vector power allocation in OFDMA networks in which the BSs operate on non-overlapping
spectrum. The users compete with each other for resources in each cell, and at the same time they are able to freely
3choose to use any (non-interfering) BS in the network. However, it is not clear how these works can be generalized
to the considered MIMO-HetNet scenario. Reference [28] is a recent work in such direction. Differently from the
present work, a downlink HetNet setting is considered. As a result, the user-BS association is determined in a
centralized fashion, which is very different than the distributed solutions to be presented in this work.
In this paper, we consider the problem of joint optimization of linear precoder and BS assignment for an uplink
MIMO heterogeneous network. Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We establish the NP-hardness of the joint precoder design and user-BS assignment problem for the weighted
sum rate (WSR) maximization in a MIMO-HetNet. This NP-hardness result is intrinsically different from the
existing complexity results [7]–[10] for the linear precoder design problem where the user-BS assignment
is fixed. In particular, for the latter results, the NP-hardness of the precoder design problem lies in how to
determine which users/antennas should be turned off due to strong interference links. However, when the
user-BS assignment is not fixed, a strong interference link can be turned into a direct link by changing the
user-BS association, thus effectively mitigating the level of interference. As a result, what makes the joint
user-BS association and precoder design problem difficult is not the presence of strong interference links, but
rather its mixed interference pattern. Therefore, the NP-hardness of the joint optimization problem does not
follow from, nor imply, any of the existing complexity results [7]–[10] for the linear precoder design problem
when the user-BS assignment is fixed.
2) We propose a novel game theoretic formulation to find a local WSR-optimal solution of the joint precoder
design and user-BS assignment problem for a MIMO heterogeneous network. In the proposed game both
the transmitters and the BSs act as players. We introduce a set of utility functions for the players and show
that every NE of the resulting game, which gives a set of precoders and user-BS assignment for all users in
the network, is a stationary solution of the WSR maximization problem. To reach a NE of the game, each
transmitter greedily determines the best linear precoder as well as the least congested BS for transmission,
whereas each BS computes a set of optimal prices to charge the users for causing interference. These prices
serve to coordinate the behavior of the users so that they do not cause excessive interference in the network.
We show that the resulting distributed algorithm converges to a NE of the game. Notice that the convergence
of the algorithm implies that the network will be stable in the sense that no user will change BSs indefinitely.
Simulation results show that this algorithm is very effective in relieving local BS congestion and achieving
high throughput and load balancing in the network.
We remark that when the user-BS assignment is fixed, our proposed game reduces to the standard precoder
optimization game. In this context, the users are again charged with a set of prices that reflect their (negative)
influence to other users. Thus, our problem formulation can be viewed as a generalization of previous results for
interference pricing (e.g. [11], [15], [16], [29]) to the MIMO interfering multiple access channel (MIMO-IMAC)
setting with general system utility functions.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give the system level description of the problem,
and provide its complexity analysis. In Section III and Section IV, we formulate the problem into a non-cooperative
game framework, and study the properties of the resulting games. Furthermore we propose an efficient algorithm
to compute the equilibrium solutions of the games. In Section V, we present numerical results to demonstrate the
performance of the proposed algorithm. Some concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
Notations: For a symmetric matrix X, X  0 signifies that X is positive semi-definite. We use Tr(X), |X|,
XH , λ(X) and Rank(X) to denote the trace, determinant, Hermitian, spectral radius and the rank of a matrix,
respectively. We use In to denote a n×n identity matrix, and use [y,x−i] to denote a vector x with its ith elements
replaced by y. Moreover, we let RN×M and CN×M denote the set of real and complex N ×M matrices, and
use SN and SN+ to denote the set of N ×N Hermitian and Hermitian semi-definite matrices, respectively. Finally,
we use the notation 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 to indicate a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, a × b = 0, and use the notation [x]+ to represent
max(x, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL, PROBLEM FORMULATION AND COMPLEXITY RESULT
We consider the uplink of a general MIMO-HetNet consisting of a set N = {1, · · · , N} of users that transmit
to a set Q = {1, · · · , Q} of BSs. Let a be a N × 1 vector representing the system association profile, i.e., an = q
means user n connects to BS q.
Suppose each user n ∈ N has Tn transmit antennas and each BS q ∈ Q has Rq receive antennas. Let Hq,n ∈
CRq×Tn be the channel matrix from transmitter n to receiver q. Assume Tn ≤ Rq for all (n, q) ∈ (N × Q), or
equivalently the channel matrices {Hq,n} are tall matrices. This assumption is reasonable as the number of antennas
at the BS is typically larger than that of the mobile users.
Let xn ∈ CTn and yq ∈ CRq denote the transmitted signal of user n and the received signal of BS q, respectively.
Then yq can be expressed as
yq =
∑
n∈N
Hq,nxn + zq (1)
where zq ∼ CN (0, σ2q IRq) is the additive white complex Gaussian noise vector. Suppose there are a maximum of Tn
data streams transmitted by user n and its data symbol vector is denoted by sn ∈ CTn . We assume E[snsHn ] = ITn .
If a linear precoder Pn ∈ CTn×Tn is used for transmission, then the transmitted vector of user n is xn = Pnsn, and
the corresponding transmit covariance matrix Sn is given by Sn , E[xnxHn ] = PnPHn ∈ STn+ . Once the covariance
matrix Sn is computed, the precoder can be obtained by Cholesky factorization. We further assume that each user
has an individual average power constraint of the form E[Tr(xnxHn )] = Tr(Sn) ≤ p¯n. Define the aggregate transmit
covariance as S , {Sn}n∈N , and the aggregate covariance excluding user n as S−n , {Sm}m6=n,m∈N .
For a fixed association profile a, the interference covariance matrix for user n (at its intended BS an) can be
5expressed as
Cn(S−n;a) , σ2anIRan +
∑
m6=n
Han,mSmH
H
an,m
.
The covariance matrix of the total received signal at BS q can be expressed as
Gq(S) , σ
2
qI+
N∑
l=1
Hq,lSlH
H
q,l. (2)
For a given user-BS association a, the achievable rate for user n is given by [30]
Rn(Sn,S−n;a) = log
∣∣IRan +Han,nSnHHan,nC−1n (S−n)∣∣ (3)
= log
∣∣∣ITn + (S 12n)HHHan,nC−1n (S−n)Han,nS 12n ∣∣∣
(i)
= log
∣∣∣∣(ITn − (S 12n)HHHan,nG−1an (S)Han,nS 12n)−1∣∣∣∣ (ii)= log ∣∣E−1n (S)∣∣ (4)
where in (i) we have used the matrix inversion lemma [31]; in (ii) we have defined En(S) as user n’s minimum
mean square error (MMSE) matrix
En(S) , ITn − (S
1
2
n)
HHHan,nG
−1
an
(S)Han,nS
1
2
n ≻ 0. (5)
The WSR of the system can be expressed as R(S;a) ,
∑
n∈N wnRn(Sn,S−n;a), where the set of nonnegative
weights {wn}Nn=1 represent the priorities of different users. We are interested in finding the optimal user-BS
assignment as well as the transmit covariance matrices that maximize the WSR. This problem can be stated as
max
S,a
R(S;a) (SYS)
s.t. Tr(Sn) ≤ p¯n, Sn ∈ STn+ , ∀ n ∈ N
an ∈ Q, ∀ n ∈ N .
Our first result shows that finding the global optimal solution to the system level problem is intractable in general.
Theorem 1: Finding the optimal BS association and the transmission covariance matrices (a,S) that solve the
problem (SYS) is strongly NP-hard.
Theorem 1 is proved based on a polynomial time transformation from the 3-SAT problem, which is a known
NP-complete problem [32]. The 3-SAT problem is described as follows. Given M disjunctive clauses C1, · · · , CM
defined on N Boolean variables X1 · · · ,XN , i.e., Cm = t1 ∨ t2 ∨ t3 with ti ∈ {X1, · · · ,XN , X¯1, · · · , X¯N}, the
problem is to check whether there exists a truth assignment for the Boolean variables such that all clauses are
satisfied (i.e., each clause evaluates to 1) simultaneously. We leave the details of the proof to the Appendix A. We
note that our complexity result differs from the recent result in [28], in which the complexity for the joint user-BS
association and precoder design problem is analyzed for the downlink direction.
Motivated by the above complexity result, we focus on designing low complexity algorithms that can provide
6approximately optimal solutions. In particular, we will consider in the sequel a more general system level problem
formulated as the following sum utility maximization problem
max
S,a
f(S;a) (SYS-U)
s.t. f(S;a) ,
∑
n∈N
fn(Rn (S;a)) , Rn(S;a) defined in (3),
Tr(Sn) ≤ p¯n, Sn ∈ STn+ , ∀ n ∈ N
an ∈ Q, ∀ n ∈ N
where fn(·) : R+ → R is the utility function of user n’s data rate. We make the following assumptions on fn(·):
A-1) fn(x) is strictly increasing, concave and coercive in x for all x ≥ 0;
A-2) fn(− log(|X|)) is strictly convex in X for all X  0.
Note that this family of utility functions includes well known utilities such as weighted sum rate, proportional
fairness and the harmonic mean rate utility functions (see [18]).
In the sequel, we will develop a distributed algorithm to compute a local stationary solution for the problem
(SYS-U). Our main approach is based on the noncooperative game theory.
III. TRANSMIT COVARIANCE OPTIMIZATION GAME FOR FIXED USER-BS ASSOCIATION
To simplify the presentation of the game theoretic approach, we first consider the case in which the user-BS
assignment is fixed in advance, and the users are only allowed to optimize their transmit covariances. We will
design a noncooperative game whose equilibrium solutions correspond to the stationary solutions of the sum utility
maximization problem (SYS-U). Extension to the general case with flexible association will be presented in the
next section.
A. Problem Formulation
When the user-BS association is fixed, the sum utility maximization problem (SYS-U) can be restated as
max
S
f(S) (SUM)
s.t. Tr(Sn) ≤ p¯n, Sn ∈ STn+ , ∀ n ∈ N .
Suppose each user n ∈ N can optimize its transmit covariance Sn. Its feasible set is given by
Fn ,
{
Sn | Tr(Sn) ≤ p¯n, Sn ∈ STn+
}
. (6)
Define the joint feasible set of all the users as F ,∏n∈N Fn.
In order to mitigate interference caused by unintended users, we allow each BS q ∈ Q to post a (matrix valued)
price Tq,n ∈ CRq to each user n ∈ N . That is, each user n incurs a total charge of Tr
[∑
q∈QTq,nSn
]
for the
7interference contributed to all the BSs in the network. Define Hq =
∏
n∈N C
Rq as the feasible set of BS q’s pricing
strategies. Define H ,∏q∈QHq as the joint feasible set of all the BSs. Let Tq = {Tq,n}n∈N , Tn = {Tq,n}q∈Q,
and T = {Tq}q∈Q.
We model both the users and the BSs as selfish players in a noncooperative game. The players are interested in
choosing their individual optimal strategies (transmit covariances for the users, and price matrices for the BSs) to
maximize their own utility functions Un(·) and Dq(·). We formulate a covariance optimization game GC as follows
GC ,
{
{N ,Q},{F ,H},{{Un(·)}n∈N , {Dq(·)}q∈Q}}.
We need to properly specify the utility functions Un(·) and Dq(·) so that the equilibriums of the game GC correspond
to the local stationary solution of the sum utility maximization problem (SUM).
B. The BSs’ Utility Maximization Problem
The BSs’ utility functions and their maximization problems are closely related to the structure of the desired
interference prices. As a result, we start by providing an explicit construction of the interference prices. Let us
define Nq , {n : an = q} as the set of users associated with BS q. Define αm(S) as the derivative of user m’s
utility function w.r.t. to its rate
αm(S) ,
∂fm(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=Rm(S)
> 0 (7)
where the positivity of αm(S) comes from the condition A-1), i.e., fm(·) is a strictly increasing function. Then at
a given system covariance S, user n’s negative marginal influence to the sum utility of users currently associated
to BS q is given by
−
∑
m∈Nq\n
▽Snfm(Rm(S))
=
∑
m∈Nq\n
αm(S)H
H
q,nC
−1
m (S−m)
(
IRq +Hq,mSmH
H
q,mC
−1
m (S−m)
)−1
Hq,mSmH
H
q,mC
−1
m (S−m)Hq,n
= HHq,n
( ∑
m∈Nq\n
αm(S)G
−1
q (S)Hq,mS
1
2
mE
−1
m (S)(S
1
2
m)
HHHq,mG
−1
q (S)
)
Hq,n  0 (8)
where in the last equality we have again used the fact that
E−1m (S) = I+ (S
1
2
m)
HHHam,mC
−1
m (S−m)Ham,mS
1
2
m. (9)
We propose to mitigate the interference generated by a user n ∈ N by charging it a penalty proportionally to
its negative marginal influence. Specifically, the interference price takes the following form
Tq,n , −
∑
m∈Nq\n
▽Snfm(Rm(S))  0. (10)
8This definition of interference price leads to the following definition of a BS q’s utility function
Dq(Tq,T−q,S) , −
∑
n∈N
∥∥∥∥Tq,n− (− ∑
m∈Nq\n
▽Snfm(Rm(S))
)∥∥∥∥. (11)
Clearly, for a fixed S ∈ F , the set of prices that maximizes BS q’s utility are given by (10). In what follows,
Tq,n(S) is occasionally used to explicitly indicate the dependency of the prices on the users’ transmit covariances.
C. The Users’ Utility Maximization Problem
To strike a balance between the user’s desire to improve its utility and the need to reduce its interference in the
network, we modify each user’s utility as the difference between its true utility and the interference charge
Un(Sn,S−n,Tn) , fn(Rn(Sn,S−n))−
∑
q∈Q
Tr [Tq,nSn] . (12)
With this modification, each user’s utility maximization problem is given by
max
Sn∈Fn
Un(Sn,S−n,Tn). (13)
Note that the function fn(Rn(Sn,S−n)) is a strictly concave function in Sn, as it is a composition of a strictly
increasing and concave function (i.e., fn(·)) and a strictly concave function of Sn (i.e., Rn(·)) (see [33, Section
3.2.4]). As a result, problem (13) has a strictly concave objective value and admits a unique solution. In the
following, we develop an efficient procedure to compute such solution.
Fix a user n ∈ N , let q = an. Let An ,
∑
l∈QTl,n  0. Using these notations, user n’s utility maximization
problem (13) can be written as
max
Sn∈Fn
fn
(
log
∣∣I+Hq,nSnHHq,nC−1n ∣∣)− Tr[AnSn]. (14)
The Lagrangian of this problem is given by
L(Sn, µn) = fn
(
log
∣∣I+Hq,nSnHHq,nC−1n ∣∣)− Tr[(An + µnI)Sn] + µnp¯n (15)
where µn ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier for the power constraint. The dual function is d(µn) = maxSn0 L(Sn, µn).
The optimal primal-dual pair (S∗n, µ∗n) should satisfy the KKT optimality conditions
S∗n = arg max
Sn∈Fn
L(Sn, µ
∗
n), S
∗
n  0 (16)
0 ≤ µ∗n ⊥ (p¯n − Tr[S∗n]) ≥ 0. (17)
For any fixed µn ≥ 0, the solution to the problem argmaxSn∈Fn L(Sn, µn) can be obtained as follows. Using
the fact that An  0, then for any µn > 0, we can perform the Cholesky decomposition An+µnI = LHn Ln, which
9results in Tr[(An + µnI)Sn] = Tr[LnSnLHn ]. Define S¯n(µn) , LnSnLHn , then we have
L(Sn, µn) = fn
(
log
∣∣Cn +Hq,nL−1n S¯n(µn)L−Hn HHq,n∣∣+ c1)− Tr[S¯n(µn)] + µnp¯n
(i)
= fn
(
log
∣∣I+B−1n Hq,nL−1n S¯n(µn)L−Hn HHq,nB−Hn ∣∣+ c2)− Tr[S¯n(µn)] + µnp¯n
(ii)
= fn
(
log
∣∣I+ Fn∆nMHn S¯n(µn)Mn∆nFHn ∣∣+ c2)− Tr[S¯n(µn)] + µnp¯n
(iii)
= fn
(
log
∣∣∣I+∆nŜn(µn)∆n∣∣∣+ c3)− Tr[Ŝn(µn)] + µnp¯n , L(Ŝn(µn)) (18)
where c1, c2, c3 are some constants that are not related to Sn. In step (i) we have used the Cholesky decomposition:
Cn = BnB
H
n ; in (ii) we have used the singular value decomposition B−1n Hq,nL−1n = Fn∆nMHn ; in (iii) we have
defined Ŝn(µn) = MHn S¯n(µn)Mn and used the fact that Mn and Fn are unitary matrices. Note that if µn = 0
and An is not full rank, we can use generalized inverse to replace L−1n . We then argue that the (unique) optimal
solution Ŝ∗n(µn) to the following problem must be diagonal
max
Ŝn(µn)0
L(Ŝn(µn)). (19)
Assume the contrary. Note that we have I+∆nŜn(µn)∆n ≻ 0. Then from the Hadamard inequality [31], we can
always remove the off-diagonal elements of the optimal solution and increase the value of log
∣∣∣I+∆nŜ∗n(µn)∆n∣∣∣
while keeping the value of Tr[Ŝ∗n(µn)] unchanged. Since fn(x) is a strictly increasing function, the objective value
is also increased, a contradiction to the optimality of the non-diagonal solution.
Let si = [Ŝn(µn)]i,i. Utilizing this diagonality property, solving the matrix optimization problem (19) reduces to
a vector optimization problem of the form
max
{si≥0}Tni=1
fn
(
Tn∑
i=1
log(1 + si[∆n]
2
i,i) + c3
)
−
Tn∑
i=1
si (20)
Let ζi denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint si ≥ 0. The optimal primal-dual variables
{s∗i , ζ∗i }Tni=1 must satisfy the following optimality conditions
∂fn(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=
∑
Tn
i=1
log(1+s∗i [∆n]
2
i,i)
[∆n]
2
i,i
1 + s∗i [∆n]
2
i,i
= 1− ζ∗i , ∀ i = 1, · · · , Tn (21)
0 ≤ ζ∗i ⊥ s∗i ≥ 0, ∀ i = 1, · · · , Tn. (22)
The condition (21) implies that there must exist a constant c∗ that satisfies
c∗ =
(
s∗i +
1
[∆n]
2
i,i
)
(1− ζ∗i ), ∀ i. (23)
where c∗ = αn
(∑Tn
i=1 log
(
1 + s∗i [∆n]
2
i,i
))
, with αn(Rn) = dfn(x)dx
∣∣
x=Rn
. Due to (23), we have
c∗ = αn
( Tn∑
i=1
log
(
c∗[∆n]2i,i
(1 − ζ∗i )
))
.
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Suppose we have the optimal c∗ (note that due to the strict concavity of problem (20), c∗ is unique), then using
condition (22) and the definition of c∗ in (23), the optimal primal-dual variables {s∗i , ζ∗i }Tni=1 can be expressed as
s∗i =
 c∗ −
1
[∆n]2i,i
, if c∗ − 1[∆n]2i,i > 0
0, otherwise,
ζ∗i =
 0, if c∗ −
1
[∆n]2i,i
> 0
(1− c∗[∆n]2i,i), otherwise.
(24)
In short, s∗i =
[
c∗ − 1[∆n]2i,i
]+
and ζ∗i =
[
1− c∗[∆n]2i,i
]+
.
Our task then becomes finding the optimal c∗. For any c ≥ 0, let us define ζ∗i (c) ,
[
1− c[∆n]2i,i
]+
. We have the
following lemma characterizing the relationship between αn(·) and c. The proof of it can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 1: For any fixed c, if αn
(∑Tn
i=1 log
( c[∆n]2i,i
1−ζ∗i (c)
))
> c, then c∗ > c. Otherwise, c∗ ≤ c.
This lemma suggests that we can find the optimal c∗ by a bisection search.
TABLE I
THE BINARY SEARCH PROCEDURE TO FIND c∗
S1) Choose cu and cl such that c∗ lies in [cl, cu].
S2) Let cmid = (cl + cu)/2
Compute s∗i (cmid) =
[
cmid − 1[∆n]2i,i
]+
and ζ∗i (cmid) =
[
1− cmid[∆n]2i,i
]+
.
S3) If αn
(∑Tn
i=1 log
( cmid[∆n]2i,i
1−ζ∗i (cmid)
))
> cmid, let cl = cmid. Otherwise, let cu = cmid.
S4) Go to S2) until the desired accuracy is reached.
Note that in the special case where the utility function is the weighted sum rate utility, i.e.,fn(Rn) = wnRn, we
have c∗ = wn. Hence no bisection search is needed, and we directly obtain s∗i =
[
wn − 1[∆n]2i,i
]+
, ∀ i = 1 · · · , Tn.
This is the well-known water-filling solution.
Once we have the solution Ŝ∗n(µn), we can obtain S∗n(µn) = L−1n MnŜ∗n(µn)MHn L−Hn . Note that L(Sn, µn) is
a strictly concave function of Sn. As a result, for a fixed µn, the solution S∗n(µn) is unique.
The remaining task is to find the optimal µ∗n that satisfies the complementarity condition (17). From a general
result on penalty method for optimization, e.g., [34, Section 12.1, Lemma 1], the solution Tr[S∗n(µn)] must be
monotonically decreasing with respect to µn. Such monotonicity result suggests that we can find the optimal µ∗n
that satisfies the complementarity and feasibility condition (17) by the following bisection search procedure.
TABLE II
THE USER’S UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROCEDURE
S1) Choose µun and µln such that µ∗n lies in [µln, µun].
S2) Let µmidn = (µln + µun)/2. Compute decomposition:
An + µ
mid
n I = L
H
n Ln
Cn = BnB
H
n
B−1n Hq,nL−1n = Fn∆nMHn .
S3) Compute c∗ using the procedure in Table I.
S4) Compute Ŝ∗n(µmidn ) by [Ŝ∗(µmidn )]i,i =
[
c∗ − 1[∆n]2i,i
]+
, i = 1 · · · , Tn.
S5) Compute S∗n(µmidn ) = L−1n MnŜ∗n(µmidn )MHn L−Hn .
S6) If Tr(S∗n(µmidn )) > p¯n, let µln = µmidn ; otherwise let µun = µmidn .
S7) If |Tr(S∗n(µmidn ))− p¯n| < ǫ or |µun − µln| < ǫ, stop; otherwise go to S2).
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D. Analysis of Nash Equilibriums (NE)
Consider the game GC . We first show that our choices of the utility functions give rise to a nice relationship
between the utility of the users and the system utility function f(S).
Proposition 1: If the conditions A-1) and A-2) are satisfied, then we have
Un(Sn, Ŝ−n,Tn(Ŝ))− Un(Ŝn, Ŝ−n,Tn(Ŝ)) > 0
=⇒ f(Sn, Ŝ−n)− f(Ŝn, Ŝ−n) > 0, ∀ Sn, Ŝn ∈ Fn, Ŝ−n ∈ F−n. (25)
Proof: Fix any S ∈ F and Ŝ ∈ F . Pick an m 6= n. Utilizing the assumption that fm(− log |X|) is convex in
X, we can linearize fm(− log |Em(Sn, Ŝ−n)|) at the point Em(Ŝn, Ŝ−n) using Taylor expansion
fm(− log |Em(Sn, Ŝ−n)|) ≥ fm(− log |Em(Ŝ)|) + Tr
[
∇Emfm(Em)
(
Em(Sn, Ŝ−n)−Em(Ŝ)
)]
= fm(− log |Em(Ŝ)|)− ∂fm(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=− log |Em(Ŝ)|
Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)(Em(Sn, Ŝ−n)−Em(Ŝ))
]
(26)
To proceed, we need the following lemma whose proof is relegated to Appendix C.
Lemma 2: The function −Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)Em(Sn,S−n)
]
is convex in Sn, for all n 6= m.
This convexity result allows us to perform a further linearization in the variable Sn via Taylor expansion of
Em(Sn, Ŝ−n) at Ŝn
− Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)(Em(Sn, Ŝ−n)−Em(Ŝ))
]
≥ −Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)(Ŝ
1
2
m)
HHHam,mG
−1
m (Ŝ)Ham,n(Sn − Ŝn)HHam,nG−1m (Ŝ)Ham,mŜ
1
2
m
]
= −Tr
[
HHam,nG
−1
m (Ŝ)Ham,mŜ
1
2
mE
−1
m (Ŝ)(Ŝ
1
2
m)
HHHam,mG
−1
m (Ŝ)Ham,n(Sn − Ŝn)
]
. (27)
Plugging (27) into (26), utilizing the expression for the negative marginal influence in (8), we obtain
∑
m 6=n
fm(Rm(Sn, Ŝ−n)) =
∑
m 6=n
fm(− log |Em(Sn, Ŝ−n)|)
≥
∑
m 6=n
{
fm(Rm(Ŝ)) + Tr
[
▽Snfm(Rm(Ŝ))(Sn − Ŝn)
]}
.
This inequality implies
f(Sn, Ŝ−n)− f(Ŝ) = fn(Sn, Ŝ−n) +
∑
m 6=n
fm(Rm(Sn, Ŝ−n))−
N∑
m=1
fm(Rm(Ŝ))
≥ fn(Rn(Sn, Ŝ−n)) +
∑
m 6=n
{
Tr
[
▽Snfm(Rm(Ŝ))(Sn − Ŝn)
]}
− fn(Rn(Ŝ))
= fn(Rn(Sn, Ŝ−n))−
∑
q∈Q
Tr [Tq,nSn]−
fn(Rn(Ŝ))−∑
q∈Q
Tr
[
Tq,nŜn
]
= Un(Sn, Ŝ−n,Tn(Ŝ))− Un(Ŝn, Ŝ−n,Tn(Ŝ)). (28)
This inequality implies that (25) is true.
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The property (25) is essentially the generalized potential property 1 for a class of so called Potential Games [35],
with only one subtle difference that in (25) the implication is dependent on a “state variable” Tn(Ŝ).
Using Proposition 1, we can establish the one-to-one correspondence between the pure NE points of the game
GC and the KKT points of the sum-utility maximization problem (SUM). Recall that a pure strategy NE of the
game GC is a tuple of strategies {S∗,T∗} such that the following set of inequalities are satisfied
Un(S
∗
n,S
∗
−n,T
∗
n) ≥ Un(Sn,S∗−n,T∗n), ∀ Sn ∈ Fn, ∀ n ∈ N
Dn(T
∗
q,T
∗
−q,S
∗) ≥ Dn(Tq,T∗−q,S∗), ∀ Tq ∈ Hq, ∀ q ∈ Q.
By utilizing Proposition 1, we have the following characterization of the NEs of the game GC .
Theorem 2: The tuple (S∗,T∗) is a NE of the game GC if and only if S∗ is a KKT point of the problem (SUM).
Proof: We give an outline of the proof here. First suppose (S∗,T∗) is a NE of the game. Then from the
definition of NE we have that for any Sn ∈ Fn and n ∈ N , Un(S∗n,S∗−n,T∗n) ≥ Un(Sn,S∗−n,T∗n). Using (25),
we have R(S∗n,S∗−n) ≥ R(Sn,S∗−n) for all Sn ∈ Fn. This means S∗n = argmaxSn∈Fn R(Sn,S∗−n), ∀ n ∈ N . We
can verify that the KKT condition of this N problems is the same as the KKT condition of the original (SUM)
problem. The other direction can be proved similarly.
IV. JOINT BS SELECTION AND TRANSMIT COVARIANCE OPTIMIZATION GAME
In this section we extend the game theoretic framework described in Section III to the case where the user-BS
associations are not fixed.
Let us define user n’s joint strategy as Jn , (Sn,an), and its feasible space as Jn = Fn × Q. Let J−n ,
(S−n,a−n), and J , {Jn}n∈N . In this case, each user’s rate is still defined by (3), but we have to make the
dependency of association profile explicit. We use Rn(Jn,J−n) to denote user n’s rate. We use Cn(S−n, [q,a−n])
to denote the interference covariance that user n would have experienced if it selects BS q, while all other users
use the strategy (S−n,a−n). Let Nq(a) denote the set of users associated with BS q under association profile a.
Moreover, to make the dependence of the sum utility maximization problem on the underlying user-BS association
explicit, we use SUM(a) to denote the sum utility maximization problem when the association profile is chosen as
a.
Let U¯n(·) and D¯q(·) denote user n and BS q’s utility functions, respectively. The joint BS selection and covariance
optimization game GJ is defined as
GJ ,
{
{N ,Q},{J ,H},{{U¯n(J,Tn)}n∈N , {D¯q(T,J)}q∈Q}}.
1The generalized potential property is referred to as the following relationship between the players’ utility functions and a “potential
function” P (·): let xn be player n’s action profile; for any two x̂n,xn ∈ χn, for all x−n ∈ χ−n, and for all player n, Un(x̂n,x−n) −
Un(xn,x−n) > 0 implies P (x̂n,x−n)− P (xn,x−n) > 0.
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We refer to the game GJ as a hybrid game, because the strategies of a subset of the players consist of a covariance
matrix and a discrete index. We define the utility functions U¯n(·) and D¯q(·) similarly as in (12) and (11)
U¯n(Jn,J−n,Tn) , fn(Rn(Jn,J−n))−
∑
q∈Q
Tr [Tq,nSn]
D¯q(Tq,T−q,J) , −
∑
n∈N
∥∥∥∥Tq,n − (− ∑
m∈Nq(a)\n
▽Snfm (Rm((Sn,an),J−m))
)∥∥∥∥.
Note that both of the utility functions defined above are dependent on the user-BS association vector a. In order to
emphasize the relationship between the optimal solution of BS q and the users’ strategies J, we occasionally use
Tq,n(J) or Tq,n(S,a) (resp. T(J) or T(S,a)) to denote the optimal prices charged by BS q to user n (resp. the
set of prices charged by all the BSs).
The pure NE of the game GJ is the tuple (J∗,T∗) that satisfies
U¯n
(
J∗n,J
∗
−nT
∗
n
) ≥ U¯n (Jn,J∗−n,T∗n) , ∀ Jn ∈ Jn, ∀ n ∈ N
D¯q(T
∗
q ,T
∗
−q,J
∗) ≥ D¯q(Tq,T∗−q,J∗), ∀ Tq ∈ Hq, ∀ q ∈ Q.
The game GJ with the utility functions defined above again possesses the “generalized potential” property, which
is essential in establishing the correspondence between the pure NEs of game GJ and the stationary solutions of
the sum-utility maximization problem.
Proposition 2: For any utility function fn(·) that satisfies the assumptions A-1) and A-2), we have
U¯n
(
Jn, Ĵ−nTn(Ĵ)
)
− U¯n
(
Ĵn, Ĵ−nTn(Ĵ)
)
> 0 (29)
=⇒ f
(
Jn, Ĵ−n
)
− f
(
Ĵn, Ĵ−n
)
> 0, ∀ Jn, Ĵn ∈ Jn, Ĵ−n ∈ J−n.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix D. The key observation used in the proof is that
Rm((Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n) = Rm((Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n), ∀ m 6= n
Tq,n(Ŝ, â) = Tq,n(Ŝ, [an, â−n]), ∀ q ∈ Q.
That is, if user n unilaterally switches from BS ân to an but keeps its covariance matrix unchanged, then all other
users’ transmission rates as well as the price charged for user n remains the same.
Due to the hybrid structure of the users’ strategy space J , conventional existence results of the NEs for a
N -person concave game (e.g., [36]) do not apply here. Fortunately, by utilizing Proposition 2, we can extend our
argument in the proof of Theorem 2 to show the following existence result of the NE of game GJ .
Theorem 3: The game GJ must admit at least one pure NE. Moreover, if (S∗,a∗,T∗) is a NE of the game GJ ,
then S∗ must be a KKT solution of the problem SUM(a∗).
Proof: We first claim that the global optimal solution of problem (SYS), say (S˜, a˜), along with the corre-
sponding price matrices T(S˜, a˜) is a NE of the game GJ . Assume the contrary, then there must exist a user n ∈ N
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with (Ŝn, ân) 6= (S˜n, a˜n) who has incentive to switch
U¯n
(
(Ŝn, ân), J˜−n,Tn(J˜)
)
> U¯n
(
J˜n, J˜−n,Tn(J˜)
)
. (30)
However, using Proposition 2, this implies that
f
(
(Ŝn, ân), J˜−n
)
> f
(
J˜n, J˜−n
)
(31)
which contradicts the global optimality of (S˜, a˜). The second part of the theorem can be shown following the same
proof in Theorem 2.
In the following, we propose a distributed algorithm for the users to reach a NE of the game GJ . Central
to the proposed algorithm is the procedure developed in the previous section that allows the users to compute
their transmit covariance matrices. The algorithm works by alternating between the users’ and the BSs’ utility
maximization problems. In each iteration t, a single user n ∈ N updates its transmit covariance and BS association
by solving its utility maximization problem
(Stn,a
t
n) = arg max
(Sn,an)∈Jn
U¯n
(
(Sn,an),J
t−1
−n ,T
t−1
n
)
. (32)
Then all the BSs update their interference prices by solving their respective utility maximization problems
Ttq = argmax
Tq
D¯q(Tq,T
t−1
−q ,J
t), ∀ q ∈ Q. (33)
Each user’s utility optimization problem (32) can be performed by the following two steps: a) solve Q inner
covariance optimization problems maxSn∈Fn U¯n ((Sn, q),J−n,Tn), one for each BS q ∈ Q (each of these problems
can be solved using the procedure listed in Table II in Section III); b) pick the best BS in terms of the optimal
value of the inner covariance optimization problem.
The proposed algorithm naturally incorporates the joint optimization of BS association and linear precoder into
individual mobile users’ optimization problem. The detailed algorithm is listed in Table III.
TABLE III
A DISTRIBUTED BEST-RESPONSE ALGORITHM
S1) Initialization: Let t = 0, each user n ∈ N randomly choose J0n ∈ Jn;
each BS q ∈ Q set T0q = 0.
S2) Choose a user n ∈ N . Compute ∑q∈QTtq,n.
S3) User n computes Jt+1n by solving:
(St+1n ,a
t+1
n ) = argmaxq∈QmaxSn∈Fn U¯n((Sn, q),St−n,at−nTtn).
For the rest of users m 6= n, set Jt+1m = Jtm.
S4) Each BS q ∈ Q updates its price matrices by
Tt+1q,n = −
∑
m∈Nq(at+1)\n ▽Snfm(Rm(S
t+1
m ,S
t+1
−m)),∀ n ∈ N .
S5) Continue: Set t = t+ 1, go to S2) unless some stopping criteria is met.
An important feature of the algorithm is that the computation of each of its steps is closed form (subject to
efficient bisection search) and distributed. We briefly remark on the distributed implementation of the algorithm.
The following three assumptions are needed for this purpose. First, local channel information is known by each
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user, that is, each user n has the knowledge of {Hq,n}q∈Q. Second, each BS has a feedback channel to all the
potential users. Third, each BS knows the utility function of the users that are associated with it.
Under these assumptions, the proposed algorithm can be implemented distributedly. At iteration t, each BS q can
compute the price Ttq,n locally by measuring the total received signal variance Gq(St) and computing the MMSE
matrix Em(St) of each associated user m ∈ Nq (cf (5) and (8)). Suppose user n is scheduled to update at iteration
t. Then all the BSs can broadcast their pricing information Ttq,n for user n as well as their total received signal
covariance Gq(St) (note, due to symmetry, only upper triangular parts of these matrices need to be transmitted).
Upon receiving all this information, user n can carry out its utility maximization locally.
Moreover, when the network is operated in a time division duplex (TDD) mode, the information that needs to
be broadcast can be significantly reduced. This reduction is made possible by utilizing the following two facts:
1) in TDD mode, the uplink channels can be viewed as the Hermitian transpose of its reverse channels (i.e.,
Hq,n = H
H
n,q); 2) each user n only needs the sum of all the prices charged for it:
∑
q∈QT
t
q,n. Specifically, the BSs
do not need to broadcast the pricing information for user n explicitly. Each BS q only needs to broadcast Gq(St)
by using the following transmit covariance matrix
∑
m∈Nq\n
αm(S)G
−1
q (S)Hq,mS
1
2
mE
−1
m (S)(S
1
2
m)
HHHq,mG
−1
q (S). (34)
This matrix can be calculated once BS q obtains the measurement of the total received signal variance Gq(St)
and computes the MMSE matrix Em(St), for all m ∈ Nq(at). In this way, user n can decode the messages and
measure the total received signal covariance expressed as
∑
q∈Q
HHq,n
 ∑
m∈Nq\n
αm(S)G
−1
q (S)Hq,mS
1
2
mE
−1
m (S)(S
1
2
m)
HHHq,mG
−1
q (S)
Hq,n. (35)
By the definition of prices in (8) and (10), the received signal covariance is precisely the total price ∑q∈QTtq,n.
In the following we provide the convergence result of the proposed algorithm. The details of the proof are
presented in Appendix E.
Theorem 4: The sequence {f(St,at)}∞t=1 generated by the proposed algorithm is monotonically increasing and
always converges. Any limit point of {St,at,Tt}∞t=1 is a NE of the game GJ .
We remark that the proposed algorithm can also be applied to the scenario in which the user-BS assignment is
fixed. In this case the users only need to perform a single inner optimization in S3). An immediate consequence
of Theorem 4 is that this reduced form of the algorithm also converges to the NE of the game GC .
Corollary 1: When the user-BS assignment is fixed, the sequence {f(St)}∞t=1 generated by the proposed algorithm
is monotonically increasing and converges. Any limit point of {St,Tt}∞t=1 is a NE of the game GC .
This corollary generalizes the convergence result presented in [37], which deals with only the single antenna
case and is limited to the weighted sum rate utility. Furthermore, it establishes the convergence for the algorithm
proposed in [11], [12], since the latter is a specialization of our algorithm to the case where the user-BS association
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is fixed and the system utility is the weighted sum rate function.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with the WMMSE algorithm [18]. The
latter is known to be an effective method to solve the sum utility maximization problem for the MIMO interference
channel, except that it requires the user-BS assignment to be fixed. To facilitate the comparison, we fix the user-BS
assignment for the WMMSE algorithm using the received signal strengths, as is done in the conventional cellular
networks. We demonstrate that the distributed algorithm proposed in this paper can achieve a higher spectrum
efficiency and more effective load balancing in a HetNet than the WMMSE algorithm.
We consider a single macro cell in a HetNet. The macro cell consists of 7 pico cells, each containing 1 pico BS, and
has a total of 16 users. The distance between adjacent pico BSs is 200 meters (representing a dense macro cell with
small pico cell sizes). Let dq,n denote the distance between pico BS q and user n. The entries of the channel Hq,n
are generated from distribution CN (0, σ2q,n), where the standard deviation is given by σq,n = (200/dq,n)3.5 Lq,n,
and 10 log 10(Lq,n) ∼ N (0, 8) is used to model the shadowing effect. We fix the environment noise power as
σq = 1,∀ q ∈ Q, and let all users have the same transmit power limit p¯n = p¯, ∀ n ∈ N . We define the signal to
noise ratio as SNR , 10 log10 p¯.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the performance of the proposed algorithm and the WMMSE algorithm when the proportional fair utility is used.
N = 16, Q = 7, users are all located at the cell edges. Left: comparison of the users’ averaged rates. Right: comparison of the CDF of
users’ achieved rates.
We first consider a scenario in which the users are all located at the pico cell edges, and one of the pico
BSs is congested. In particular, we place half of the users uniformly at the cell edges of BS 1, which is within
d1,n ∈ [90, 100] meters. We place the rest of the users randomly at the cell edges of other pico BSs. For the
WMMSE algorithm, we let the users associate to the pico BSs with the strongest direct channel (in terms of the 2-
norm of the channel matrices). For our proposed algorithm, we place a restriction that the users can only choose their
association among the three strongest pico BSs. We initiate our algorithm by assigning the users to their respective
strongest pico BSs. Fig. 1 compares the performance of the algorithms when the proportional fairness utility is
used, i.e., fn(Rn) = log(Rn), ∀ n ∈ N . Each point on this figure is averaged over 100 randomly generated user
positions and channel coefficients. The left panel of Fig. 1 compares the users’ averaged rates achieved by different
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algorithms. The right panel of Fig. 1 compares the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the individual rates of
the two algorithms when SNR = 30dB. Fig. 1 shows that if the user-BS assignment is allowed to be optimized, the
proposed algorithm can achieve a substantially higher spectrum efficiency and fairer rate allocation, as compared to
the case when the user-BS assignment is fixed. This is reasonable since assigning weak users to less congested BSs
(rather than the closest BSs) effectively reduces the interference level (hence the congestion level) of the congested
BS. In this way, both user fairness and the spectral efficiency of the entire network are enhanced.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the performance of the proposed algorithm and the WMMSE algorithm in a HetNet with different BS capabilities.
The proportional fair utility is used. N = 16, Q = 7. Half of the users are uniformly distributed in cell 1, all other users are uniformly
distributed in other cells. Three neighboring BSs have 10 receiving antennas, and all other BSs have the same number of antennas as BS 1
(which is either 2 or 4). Left: comparison of the users’ averaged rates. Right: comparison of the CDF of users’ achieved rates.
To highlight the load balancing capability of the proposed algorithm, we next consider a scenario in a HetNet
where the pico BSs have different capabilities. Specifically, three out of the six neighboring pico BSs of BS 1
have 10 receive antennas, and all other pico BSs (including BS 1) have fewer receive antennas. Half of the users
are uniformly located in cell 1 (which is within d1,n ∈ [20, 100] meters) and the rest of the users are uniformly
located in other cells (dq,n ∈ [20, 100] meters, q 6= 1). Again we use the proportional fairness utility function, and
the proposed algorithm compares favorably with the WMMSE algorithm. See Fig. 2.
Interestingly, by using the proposed joint BS association and linear precoder optimization algorithm, the “cell
breathing” phenomenon [20] can be observed. This phenomenon refers to the desirable load balancing property of
a network: when a cell is congested, it contracts and the cell edge users automatically switch to adjacent cells. See
Fig. 3 for an illustration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the joint design of the user-BS assignment and the users’ linear precoder in a
multicell heterogeneous network. By a careful user-BS association, users in a hot spot can avoid congesting the
nearest BS or causing excessive interference to each other. Unfortunately the overall joint optimization problem is
shown to be computationally intractable. To find a high quality locally optimal solution, we propose an efficient
and low-complexity algorithm using a game theoretic formulation. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm
18
100 200 300 400 500 600 700100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
X [Meters]
Y 
[M
ete
rs
]
Fig. 3. Illustration of the cell breathing phenomenon. Q = 7, N = 20, Rn = 4, Tq = 4, proportional fair utility is used. In the figures, the
diamonds denote the BSs, the dots denote the users, and the lines indicate associations. Left: user-BS assignment in which users are associated
to the BS with the strongest channel magnitude in terms of 2-norm. Right: user-BS assignment generated by the proposed algorithm.
is demonstrated via numerical simulations which show substantially improved spectrum efficiency and fairness
provisioning. A drawback of this algorithm is the fact that it requires the exact knowledge of channel state
information (CSI). An important issue worth investigating is to what extent we can use inexact channel state
information or just use the long-term channel statistics in place of the CSI. Another interesting issue is to incorporate
the users’ quality of service constraints in the problem formulation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Given M disjunctive clauses C1, · · · , CM defined on N Boolean variables X1 · · · ,XN , i.e., Cm = t1∨
t2∨t3 with ti ∈ {X1, · · · ,XN , X¯1, · · · , X¯N}, the 3-SAT problem is to check whether there exists a truth assignment
for the Boolean variables such that all clauses are satisfied (i.e., each clause evaluates to 1) simultaneously. Let
π(Cm, i) denote the ith term of the clause Cm, and let I(t) denote the index of a term t’s corresponding variable.
For example if Cm = X¯1 ∨ X¯2 ∨X4, then π(Cm, 1) = X¯1, and I(π(Cm, 3)) = 4.
Given any 3-SAT problem with M disjunctive clauses and N variables, we construct an instance of multiple BS
multi-user uplink network with 3M +N BSs and M + 2N users. Let Tn = Rq = 1, σ2q = 1, p¯n = 1 and wn = 1,
for all q, n. Let hq,n denote the channel coefficient between user n and BS q. For each clause Cm, we construct 3
clause BSs {c1m, c2m, c3m}, and construct 1 clause user denoted as user Cm. For each variable Xn, we construct 1
variable BS denoted as xn, and construct 2 variable users denoted as X¯n,Xn. The channel coefficients are specified
as follows. The clause user Cm has nonzero channels only to the clause BSs {cim}3i=1. The variable user Xn has
nonzero channels only to the variable BS xn and the clause BS Cim that satisfies X¯n = π(Cm, i). Similarly, the user
X¯n has nonzero channels to the variable BS xn and the clause BS Cim that satisfies Xn = π(Cm, i). Specifically,
the channel coefficients are designed as:
hq,Cm =

√
7, q ∈ {c1m, c2m, c3m},
0, q /∈ {c1m, c2m, c3m}.
(36)
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hq,Xn =

√
7, q = xn,
1, q = cim, and π(Cm, i) = X¯n,
0, otherwise.
(37)
hq,X¯n =

√
7, q = xn,
1, q = cim, and π(Cm, i) = Xn,
0, otherwise.
(38)
To illustrate, for a given clause Cm = X1 ∨ X¯2 ∨X3, we construct the network shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Construction of the network for clause Cm = X1∨X¯2∨X3.
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Our claim is that the 3-SAT problem will be satisfied if and only if the network we constructed achieves a total
sum rate of at least 3(M +N).
Suppose that the 3-SAT problem is satisfied, then we perform the following assignment: 1) If Xn = 1, assign
the corresponding variable user Xn to BS xn. Otherwise, assign user X¯n to BS xn. 2) for each clause Cm, pick
an index i∗m ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that π(Cm, i∗m) = 1 (note that because the 3-SAT problem is satisfied, we can always
do so). Assign the clause user Cm to the clause BS ci
∗
m
m . We claim that by the above user-BS assignment, and
by letting all the assigned users transmit with full power, the overall sum rate achieved is 3(M + N). To argue
this claim, we first note that there is a single user in the variable user pair X¯n,Xn that transmits with full power
to BS xn. Thus each variable BS xn is free of multiuser interference and obtains a rate of log(1 + 71) = 3. We
then consider an arbitrary clause Cm, and pick a term t that evaluates to 1, i.e., t = π(Cm, i∗m). According to our
assignment scheme, user t¯ does not transmit while user t transmits with full power. By our construction of the
channel in (36)–(38), the only variable user that has nonzero channel to the clause BS ci∗mm is user t¯. Since user
t¯ does not transmit, then the clause user Cm can transmit to clause BS ci
∗
m
m free of interference. Consequently it
obtains a rate of log(1 + 71) = 3. In summary, each variable BS is able to achieve a rate of 3, while each set of
three clause BSs {c1m, c2m, c3m} obtains a total rate of 3. Thus the total system sum rate is 3(M +N).
Conversely, suppose the network achieves a total rate of 3(M + N), we argue that the corresponding 3-SAT
problem must be satisfied. We show this direction by three steps.
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Step 1) We first claim that for any variable BS xn, its maximum achievable sum rate is obtained when a single
variable user, Xn or X¯n, transmits to it using full power, while the remaining user does not transmit. Let pXn and
pX¯n denote the transmission power of user Xn and X¯n, respectively. The rate region of this uplink channel when
the interference is treated as noise can be expressed as
R = {(RX¯n(pXn , pX¯n), RXn(pXn , pX¯n)) : 0 ≤ pXn ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pX¯n ≤ 1}
where RXn(pXn , pX¯n) = log
(
1 +
pXn|hxn,Xn|2
1 + pX¯n |hxn,X¯n|2
)
RX¯n(pXn , pX¯n) = log
(
1 +
pX¯n |hxn,X¯n|2
1 + pXn |hxn,Xn|2
)
(39)
with the channel coefficients given as hxn,X¯n = hxn,Xn =
√
7. In [38], Charafeddine and Paulraj derived a complete
characterization of this rate region (without time-sharing operation). This region (plotted in Fig. 5) asserts that the
sum rate maximum point can be achieved only if a single user transmits using its full power (at point A or B).
Step 2) We then argue that a variable user should never be assigned to any clause BS at the sum-rate optimal
solution. To see this, consider an arbitrary Cm and an arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let t = π(Cm, i). Suppose at the
optimal solution user t transmits to BS cim, then it can obtain a maximum rate of log(1 + 11) = 1. If BS xI(t) has
no associated user at the optimal solution, then the same user t can switch to BS xI(t) and obtain a rate increase
of log(1 + 71) − log(1 + 1) = 2. This is a contradiction to the optimality of the solution. Consequently BS xI(t)
must have user t¯ associated to it. In this case, the maximum sum rate that user t and t¯ can obtain is the optimal
solution for the following problem
max
0≤pt,pt¯≤1
log
(
1 +
7pt¯
1 + 7pt
)
+ log (1 + pt) .
Clearly at the optimal pt¯ = 1, and the tuple (pt, pt¯) = (0, 1) is a feasible solution to the above problem with
an objective value log(1 + 71) = 3. We then argue that (pt, pt¯) = (0, 1) is in fact the optimal solution to this
optimization problem. Specifically, we will show that the following is true
log
(
1 +
7
1 + 7pt
)
+ log (1 + pt) < log(1 + 7), ∀ 0 < pt ≤ 1. (40)
Equivalent we show the following inequality
f(pt) ,
(
1 +
7
1 + 7pt
)
(1 + pt) < 8, ∀ 0 < pt ≤ 1. (41)
Note that df(pt)
dpt
= 1− 42(1+7pt)2 . So when pt ∈ [0,
√
42−1
7 ], the slope of f(pt) is negative, and the functional value of
f(pt) is strictly decreasing. when pt ∈ (
√
42−1
7 , 1], the functional value of f(pt) is strictly increasing. Combining
with the fact that f(0) = 8 and f(1) = 2 + 74 < 8, we have that f(pt) < 8 for all 0 < pxn ≤ 1. In summary, a
variable user never transmits to any clause BS at the sum rate optimal solution.
Step 3) The third step is to show that any clause BS tuple {c1m, c2m, c3m} can at most obtain a rate of log(1+ 71) = 3
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at the sum rate optimal point. This step is trivial as the only candidate that can select and transmit to clause BSs
{cim}3i=1 is the clause user Cm. When there is no interference, the maximum rate user Cm (and equivalently the
set of BSs {cim}3i=1) can get is log(1 + 7) = 3. Note that this maximum rate can be achieved only when at least
one of these clause BSs does not experience interference from the variable users.
Step 2-3 together imply that each variable BS and each clause BS tuple {cim}3i=1 are able to achieve a rate
at most 3 at sum rate optimal point. As a result, in order to achieve a system rate of 3(M + N), each of them
must achieve a rate that exactly equals to 3. From Step 3, for any clause Cm, if a BS tuple {cim}3i=1 achieves a
throughput of 3, then it is only possible that there exists a index i∗m and a user t∗m = C(m, i∗m) such that user t¯∗m
does not transmit. Set the terms t∗m = 1 for each clause m = 1, · · · ,M . This assignment ensures that every clause
Cm contains at least one term that is assigned to 1. Consequently, the 3-SAT problem is satisfied.
Since the above construction only involves universal constants, the joint linear precoder design and base station
selection problem (SYS) is strongly NP-hard. The proof is complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose the contrary, that αn
(∑Tn
i=1 log
( c[∆n]2i,i
1−ζ∗i (c)
))
> c and
c∗ ≤ c. Define s∗i (c) ,
[
c− 1[∆n]2i,i
]+
. Define the following two sets
I(c) , {i | s∗i (c) = 0} , I(c) , {i | s∗i (c) > 0} .
From the definition s∗i (c) =
[
c− 1[∆n]2i,i
]+
, ζ∗i (c) =
[
1− c[∆n]2i,i
]+
, we have
αn
(
Tn∑
i=1
log
(
c[∆n]
2
i,i
1− ζ∗i (c)
))
= αn
 ∑
i∈I(c)
log
(
c[∆n]
2
i,i
1− ζ∗i (c)
)
= αn
 ∑
i∈I(c)
log
(
c[∆n]
2
i,i
) .
Note that if c∗ ≤ c, we have I(c∗) ⊆ I(c), I(c∗) ⊇ I(c). This together with the fact that c∗ ≤ c imply
∑
i∈I(c)
log
(
c[∆n]
2
i,i
) ≥ ∑
i∈I(c∗)
log
(
c∗[∆n]2i,i
)
.
Since, as the derivative of a concave utility function, the function αn(·) is monotonically decreasing, we obtain
αn
(
Tn∑
i=1
log
(
c∗[∆n]
2
i,i
1− ζ∗i (c∗)
))
= αn
 ∑
i∈I(c∗)
log
(
c∗[∆n]
2
i,i
)
≥ αn
 ∑
i∈I(c)
log
(
c[∆n]
2
i,i
) > c ≥ c∗.
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This is a contradiction to the optimality condition that
αn
(
Tn∑
i=1
log
(
c∗[∆n]2i,i
1− ζ∗i (c∗)
))
= c∗.
Thus we conclude that any fixed c, if αn
(∑Tn
i=1 log
( c[∆n]2i,i
1−ζ∗i (c)
))
> c, then c∗ > c.
The other direction can be shown similarly.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We show that the function −Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)Em(Sn,S−n)
]
is convex in Sn. Let
gm(Sn) , Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)(S
1
2
m)
HHHam,mG
−1
m (S)Ham,mS
1
2
m
]
.
From [33], we see that in order to prove that gm(Sn) is convex in Sn, it is sufficient to prove that gm(Sn+ tD)
is convex in the scalar variable t, for any fixed direction D ∈ STn as long as Sn + tD ∈ STn+ . In what follows, we
will show that for all D ∈ STn that satisfies Sn + tD  0, we have ∂
2g(Sn+tD)
∂t2
≥ 0.
To proceed, we make the following definitions
B , Han,nDH
H
an,n
,
Gm(t) , σ
2
an
I+
N∑
l=1
Han,lSlH
H
an,l
+ tHan,nDH
H
an,n
.
The first and second order derivatives of gm(Sn + tD) with respect to t can be expressed as
∂gm(Sn + tD)
∂t
= −Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)(S
1
2
m)
HHH
am,m
G−1m (t)BG
−1
m (t)Ham,mS
1
2
m
]
∂2gm(Sn + tD)
∂t2
= 2Tr
[
E−1m (Ŝ)(S
1
2
m)
HHHam,mG
−1
m (t)BG
−1
m (t)BG
−1
m (t)Ham,mS
1
2
m
]
.
The fact that Sn + tD ≻ 0 ensures Gm(t) ≻ 0, which further implies
(S
1
2
n)
HHHan,nG
−1
m (t)BG
−1
m (t)BG
−1
m (t)Han,nS
1
2
n  0.
Combining with the fact that E−1m (Ŝ) ≻ 0, we conclude that ∂
2gm(Sn+tD)
∂t2
≥ 0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: We first write an equivalent form of (29) (note that we have defined Ĵ = (Ŝ, â))
U¯n
(
Jn, Ĵ−n,Tn(Ĵ)
)
− U¯n
(
Ĵn, Ĵ−n,Tn(Ĵ)
)
=
[
U¯n
(
(Sn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, â)
)
− U¯n
(
(Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])
)]
+
[
U¯n
(
(Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])
)
− U¯n
(
(Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, â)
)]
. (42)
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We show that the following identities are true
Rm((Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n) = Rm((Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n), ∀ m 6= n (43)
Tq,n(Ŝ, â) = Tq,n(Ŝ, [an, â−n]), ∀ q ∈ Q. (44)
This set of equations implies that if user n unilaterally switches from BS ân to an but keeps its covariance matrix
unchanged, then all other users’ transmission rates as well as the prices charged for user n remain the same.
Identity (43) is straightforward as the interference at user m’ receiver caused by user n is unchanged as long as
user n’s transmit covariance matrix remains to be Ŝn.
To verify (44), we first recall that the prices are defined as follows
Tq,n(Ŝ, â) = −
∑
m∈Nq(â)\n
∂fm(Rm)
∂Rm
∣∣∣∣
Rm=Rm(Ŝ)
HHq,nC
−1
m (Ŝ−m)
(
IRq +Hq,mŜmH
H
q,mC
−1
m (Ŝ−m)
)−1
×Hq,mŜmHHq,mC−1m (Ŝ−m)Hq,n. (45)
Take any BS q that satisfies q 6= an and q 6= ân. Clearly we have {m : m ∈ Nq(â),m 6= n} = {m : m ∈
Nq([an, â−n]),m 6= n}. For BS q = ân or q = an, although user n has changed its association, the other users’
associations remain the same. That is, we again have {m : m ∈ Nq(â),m 6= n} = {m : m ∈ Nq([an, â−n]),m 6=
n}. Combining the above two observations with the fact that the transmit covariances Ŝ of all the users remain the
same, we conclude that Tq,n(Ŝ, â) = Tq,n(Ŝ, [an, â−n]), for all q ∈ Q. This proves (44).
Now using (44), the first difference in (42) becomes
U¯n
(
(Sn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, â)
)
− U¯n
(
(Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])
)
=
(
U¯n
(
(Sn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])
)
− U¯n
(
(Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])
))
(i)
≤ f
(
(Sn,an), Ĵ−n
)
− f
(
(Ŝn,an), Ĵ−n
)
. (46)
where the inequality (i) is due to (28), which states that for a fixed system association profile ([an, â−n] in this
case), the user n’s increase of utility induced by unilateral change of its transmit covariance is upper bounded by
the increase of the system sum utility. The second difference in (42) becomes
U¯n
(
(Ŝn, an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])
)
− U¯n
(
(Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, â)
)
= fn
(
Rn((Ŝn, an), Ĵ−n)
)
− Tr
[
Tn(Ŝ, [an, â−n])Ŝn
]
− fn
(
Rn((Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n)
)
+ Tr
[
Tn(Ŝ, â)Ŝn
]
(i)
= fn
(
Rn((Ŝn, an), Ĵ−n)
)
− fn
(
Rn((Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n)
)
(ii)
=
N∑
m=1
fm
(
Rm((Ŝm, am), Ĵ−m)
)
− fm
(
Rm((Ŝm, âm), Ĵ−m)
)
= f
(
(Ŝn, an), Ĵ−n
)
− f
(
(Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n
)
(47)
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where the step (i) follows from (44) and step (ii) is due to (43). Combining (42), (46) and (47), we have that
U¯n
(
(Sn,an), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, â)
)
− U¯n
(
(Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n,Tn(Ŝ, â)
)
≤ f
(
(Sn,an), Ĵ−n
)
− f
(
(Ŝn, ân), Ĵ−n
)
. (48)
This proves the claim.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
By the generalized potential property stated in Proposition 2, the sequence {f(St,at)} is monotonically increasing
and converges. Let us denote the limit of this sequence as f∗.
Let A be the set of association profiles that appear infinitely often in the sequence {at}. Take any a ∈ A, define
the subsequence {at˜k} of {at} that satisfies
at˜k = a, and am 6= a, ∀ m ∈ (t˜k, t˜k+1).
Clearly the sequence {f(St˜k ,at˜k)}k is also increasing and converges to f∗. Let S∗ be a limit point of {St˜k}. Take a
further subsequence {atk} of {at˜k} such that limk→∞ Stk = S∗. Due to the fact that Tn(·) is a continuous function
in S, the subsequence {Ttkn (Stk)} must be convergent for all n. Let T∗n = Tn(S∗) for all n. We wish to show that
(S∗,a,T∗) is a NE of the game GJ . The desired result will be shown in two steps.
S1) U¯n(S∗,a,T∗n) ≥ U¯n([Sn,S∗−n], [an,a−n],T∗n), ∀ Sn ∈ Fn ∀n ∈ N .
S2) U¯n(S∗,a,T∗n) ≥ U¯n([Sn,S∗−n], [ân,a−n],T∗n), ∀ ân 6= an, ∀ Sn ∈ Fn. ∀n ∈ N .
Without loss of generality (by possibly restricting to a further subsequence), we can assume that at time instance
tk + 1, it is user 1’s turn to act.
Step 1) Let (S∗1)tk be the (unique) solution to the problem maxS1∈F1 U¯1(S1,Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1 ). To show S1), it is
sufficient to show that limk→∞ ‖(S∗)tk1 − Stk1 ‖ = 0. Due to the strict concavity of U¯1(S1,S−1,a,T1) in S1, and
use the definition of (S∗1)tk , we have:
U¯1
(
(S∗1)
tk ,Stk−1,a
tk ,Ttk1
)
> U¯1
(
S1 + t((S
∗
1)
tk − S1),Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1
)
, ∀ t ∈ [0, 1), S1 6= (S∗1)tk . (49)
We will show that limk→∞(S∗1)tk − Stk1 = 0. The proof is along the lines of that of [39, Proposition 2.7.1], but
with some important modifications, due to the lack of concavity/convexity of the function f(·) with S1. Suppose
{(S∗1)tk−Stk1 } does not converge to 0. Let γtk , ‖(S∗1)tk−Stk1 ‖, then by possibly restricting to a further subsequence
of {tk}, we can find a γ¯ > 0 such that γtk ≥ γ¯, ∀ k. Let Vtk1 = ((S∗1)tk − Stk1 )/γtk , which is equivalent to
(S∗1)
tk = Stk1 + γ
tkVtk1 . Clearly, ‖Vtk1 ‖ = 1, and by possibly restricting to a further subsequence, we assume that
Vtk1 converges to V¯1.
Let us fixed some ǫ ∈ (0, 1). We must have 0 < ǫγ¯ < γtk . So Stk1 + ǫγ¯Vtk1 lies on the line segment joining Stk1
and Stk1 + γtkV
tk
1 = (S
∗
1)
tk
. Since (Stk+11 ,a
tk+1
1 ) is the solution to user 1’s utility optimization problem at time
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tk + 1, we have (recall that Jtk−1 = (Stk−1,atk−1))
U¯1((S
tk+1
1 ,a
tk+1
1 ),J
tk
−1,T
tk
1 )
≥ U¯1((S∗1)tk ,Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1 ) = U¯1(Stk1 + γtkVtk1 ,Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1 )
≥ U¯1(Stk + ǫγ¯Vtk ,Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1 ) ≥ U¯1(Stk1 ,Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1 ).
where the last two steps follow from the concavity of U¯ (cf. (49)). Combining the above inequality with (48), we
have
f((Stk+11 ,a
tk+1
1 ),J
tk
−1)− f((Stk1 ,atk1 ),Jtk−1)
≥ U¯1((Stk+11 ,atk+11 ),Jtk−1,Ttk1 )− U¯1((Stk1 ,atk1 ),Jtk−1,Ttk1 )
≥ U¯1(Stk + ǫγ¯Vtk ,Stk−1,atk ,Ttk1 )− U¯1((Stk1 ,atk1 ),Jtk−1,Ttk1 ) ≥ 0. (50)
Due to the fact that the sequence {f(St,at)} converges to f∗, we can take the limit of (50), and obtain
0 ≥ U¯1(S∗1 + ǫγ¯V¯,S∗−1,a,T∗1)− U¯1(S∗,a,T∗1) ≥ 0. (51)
From the assumption, γ¯ > 0, and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we have ǫγ¯V¯ 6= 0. This contradicts the fact that for fixed a,
U¯1(S1,S
∗−1,a,T∗1) has a unique maximizer (which can be seen by setting t = 0 in (49)). We conclude that
(S∗1)tk − Stk1 converges to 0. Due to the fact that limk→∞ Stk = S∗, we have (S∗1)tk converges to S∗1. This implies
U¯1([S
∗
1,S
∗
−1],a,T
∗
1) ≥ U¯1([S1,S∗−1],a,T∗1), ∀ S1 ∈ F1. (52)
Step 2) From (48), we have that
f((Stk+11 ,a
tk+1
1 ),J
tk−1)− f((Stk1 ,atk1 ),Jtk−1)
≥ U¯1((Stk+11 ,atk+11 ),Jtk−1,Ttk1 )− U¯1((Stk1 ,atk1 ),Jtk−1,Ttk1 ) ≥ 0.
Utilizing the above relationship as well as the fact that the sequence {f(St,at)} converges to f∗, we have the
following limiting arguments (notice the fact that atk = a, ∀ k)
lim
k→∞
U¯1(S
tk+1,atk+1,Ttk1 ) = lim
k→∞
U¯1(S
tk ,atk ,Ttk1 ) = U¯1(S
∗,a,T∗1).
From the definition of (Stk+11 ,a
tk+1
1 ), we must have
U¯1(S
tk+1,atk+1,Ttk1 ) ≥ U¯1([S1,Stk−1], [â1,atk−1],Ttk1 ), ∀ â1 6= atk1 , ∀ S1 ∈ F1.
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Taking limit of both sides, and notice the fact that atk = a, ∀ k, we have
lim
k→∞
U¯1(S
tk+1,atk+1,Ttk1 ) = U¯1(S
∗,a,T∗1)
≥ lim
k→∞
U¯1([S1,S
tk
−1], [â1,a
tk
−1],T
tk
1 )
= U¯1([S1,S
∗
−1], [â1,a−1],T
∗
1), ∀ â1 6= a1, ∀ S1 ∈ F1.
This says
U¯1(S
∗,a,T∗1) ≥ U¯1([S1,S∗−1], [â1,a−1],T∗1), ∀ â1 6= a1, ∀ S1 ∈ F1. (53)
Combining (52) and (53), we have
U¯1 (S
∗,a,T∗1) ≥ U¯1
(
[S1,S
∗
−1], [â1,a−1],T
∗
1
)
, ∀ S1 ∈ F1, â1 ∈ Q. (54)
Enumerating the above steps for all n ∈ N , we have that (54) is true for every user, thus (S∗,a,T∗) is a NE of
game GJ .
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